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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

the Case

This case involves a claim for declaratory relief, seeking a determination of whether the
Idaho Emergency Communications Act, LC. § 31-4801 et seq. ("the Act"), applies to Appellant
TracFone Wireless, Inc. ("TracFone"), a non-licensed reseller of prepaid wireless services, and a
dependent claim for relief in the form of monetary damages for back taxes that TracFone was,
according to the Respondents, duty-bound to collect from its Idaho customers but did not. In
short, this is a case of statutory interpretation, where the analysis by the Respondents and the
District Court was so tortured that it took multiple attempts to try to establish how the language
of the subject taxing statute could clearly and unambiguously apply to TracF one. The difficulty
that the District Court had with conforming the plain and literal language of the statute to its
desired conclusion is best expressed in the District Court's own words:

Whether schooled in the intricacies of the English language or not, no
reasonable person could argue that these sentences are well-written or
.fee from error.
(R. at 001852 (emphasis added).) This appeal follows an Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)

Certificate of Final Judgment on the declaratory claim, only, as TracFone contends that the
District Court erred in its determination that a statute with so many obvious flaws could clearly

and unambiguously apply to TracFone.
At issue is whether the Act's taxing prov1s10ns were drafted so clearly and
unambiguously as to confer a collection and remittance obligation upon entities like TracFone,
who are not licensed by the Federal Communications Commission, but merely resell the wireless
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(cellular) telecommunications services of companies who are licensed. It is contrary to all logic
that a statute can be ultimately deemed "clear and unambiguous" when: (1) for years preceding
this litigation, the enforcing state agency responsible for administering the statute repeatedly
discussed the need for amending, and indeed "fix[ing]" the statute; (2) the Counties responsible
for collecting the tax, for years before this litigation began, did not do so; (3) the Respondents'
first effort on summary judgment failed due to the fact that the interpretation Respondents had
chosen to demonstrate the "clear and unambiguous" nature of the taxing statute proved to be
factually and legally wrong; (4) the District Court's grant of summary judgment on Respondents'
second effort was premised upon a contradiction in the District Court's memorandum decision
regarding the plain language of the statute, as subsequently acknowledged by the District Court
on Reconsideration; (5) the ultimate analysis employed by the District Court in denying
TracFone's Motion for Reconsideration again shifted interpretations of the statute to employ a
reasoning that is not found anywhere in the plain language of the statute; and (6) in 2013, the
Idaho legislature enacted new legislation for the explicit purpose of imposing for the first time a
911 tax collection and remittance obligation and mechanism for providers of prepaid wireless
service. The applicability of a truly clear and unambiguous Act ought to have been more readily
apparent than this history suggests.
II.

Facts and Procedural History
A. The Parties

TracFone is a reseller of Commercial Mobile Radio service ("CMRS"). (R. at 000886.)
Specifically, it resells cellular radiotelephone service and personal communications service sold
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to it from licensed cellular radiotelephone serYice can-iers and licensed personal communications
service carriers, including AT&T Mobility, Verizon Wireless, and T-Mobile. (Id.) Cellular
radiotelephone service systems are licensed by the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") pursuant to Part 22 of the FCC's regulations (47 C.F.R. Part 22), and personal
communications service systems are licensed pursuant to Part 24 of the FCC's regulations (47
C.F.R. Part 24). TracFone does not hold any licenses in either cellular radiotelephone service or
personal communications service, nor is it required to do so as a reseller of wireless service. (R.
at 000886.) That TracFone holds no FCC licenses has been recognized throughout the duration
of this litigation. (See, e.g., R. at 000518.)
Though TracFone resells certain CMR services, it does not sell, resell, or otherwise
provide any Specialized Mobile Radio ("SMR") services. (Id.) SMR services are a specific type
of CMR services regulated under the FCC. See 47 C.F.R. 20.18. SMR systems are licensed by
the FCC pursuant to regulations codified at Part 90 of the FCC regulations. See 47 C.F.R. Part
90. Indeed, "Specialized Mobile Radio system" is specifically defined in 47 C.F.R. Section 90.7:
"A radio system in which licensees provide land mobile communications services (other than
radio location services) in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands on a· commercial basis to entities
eligible to be licensed under this Part, Federal Government entities, and individuals." 47 C.F.R. §
90. 7. As indicated at Section 90.1 (b) of the FCC regulations, SMR systems include Public
Safety, Industrial/Business Radio Pool, and Radiolocation Radio Services. TracFone does not
operate in any of those services, nor does it resell any SMR services. (R. at 000886.)
The Idaho Emergency Communications Commission ("IECC") was created by Idaho
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Code § 31-4815 for the purpose of administering the Act. 1

§ 31-4815, 4816. The E911 fees

are to be remitted to the counties and 911 serYice areas throughout the state. I.C. § 31-4818.
Hence, the involvement of Respondents Ada County and the Idaho Association of Counties in
this litigation (collectively, the "Counties").
B. Prepaid Wireless Service

In recent years (both before and after the last relevant amendment to the Act (2007 2)), the
telecommunications industry has seen an increase wireless communications service (cell phone
service) offered on a "prepaid" basis. Traditional post-paid or "billed" wireless service involves
a customer receiving a monthly bill for the services used during the prior month (airtime, data,
etc.). With prepaid service, in contrast, there is no monthly or any other bill, and no financial
transaction occurs between the wireless serYice provider and the customer. Rather, the customer
purchases quantities of wireless airtime from a retail vendor (e.g. Wal-Mart) and uses the
purchased airtime as needed. Some customers may purchase airtime several times in one month,
while other customers may purchase enough airtime in one transaction to last several months or
longer. Unlike the customer of a billed service, the prepaid customer need not provide a billing
address or any other contact information, as prepaid services can be purchased at numerous

The Counties (including collectively Ada County and the Idaho Association of Counties), 911
Service Areas, and the IECC are collectively referred to here as "the state-affiliated parties."
1

2

As discussed hereinbelow, the Act was amended again in 2013 to specifically add legislation to
create a mechanism for applying an E911 fee to prepaid wireless services. Prior to the 2013
amendments, which post-date the filing of this litigation, there was no such specific provision in
the Act. Thus, this appeal is about whether the '2007 and earlier' versions of the Act
unambiguously applied to TracFone, an unlicensed reseller of of prepaid wireless services.
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independent retailers, online, in airports while traveling, or at a gas station on a business trip.
Important to this appeal, however, is that regardless of how or where the customer purchases
airtime, the nature of the service (the mode of cellular/wireless information transmission as well
as the service's features and functionalities) remains exactly the same as service purchased on a
post-paid or billed basis. (R. at 000886.)
C. The E911 Tax

The Idaho Emergency Communications Act, enacted in 1988 and amended from time to
time since, created an "Emergency Communications Fee" ("E911 Fee") for the purpose of
"providing a means to finance the initiation, maintenance, operation, enhancement and
governance of consolidated emergency communications systems." LC. § 31-4801. Crucial to
this appeal and the level of scrutiny that must be applied to the language of the Act is the
established determination that the E911 Fee created by Idaho Code § 31-4804 is not, in fact, a
"fee" according to relevant legal precedent. Rather, in view of well-settled Idaho law
distinguishing between taxes and fees, the E91 l Fee is a statutorily-imposed tax on customers of
covered telecommunications providers. See generally I.C. 31-4804. This is a position that has
long been held by the Idaho Attorney General's office ("the AG"), which also represents the
state and the IECC in this action.
The AG has previously issued two opinions addressing this issue: AGO No. 89-4 (R. at
001656-1664) and AGO 1994-G-0921 (R. at 001665-1667), both of which conclude that the
telephone line user fees described in the Act are properly characterized as taxes, not user fees.
First, in 1989, the AG noted that "[t)he Emergency Communications Act was enacted in 1988 to
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an alternative to property taxes for funding county 911

communications

systems . . . . Emergency Communications Act charges are taxes rather than fees."
001657.) Quoting Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768

(R. at

765 (1988) the AG

concluded: "[T]he charge is defined as a uniform amount . . . . The charge does not fit the
definition of a fee given in Brewster, supra." (R. at 001659.) The AG reiterated in 1994 that "the
charge is a tax rather than a fee":
More importantly, a statute authorizing the imposition of a tax must be
construed "as favorablv as possible to the taxpaver and strictly
against the taxing authority." Futura Corporation v. State Tax
Commission, 92 Idaho 288,291,442 P.2d 174, 177 (1968). Further, any
ambiguities in a tax statute must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer.
In re: Potlatch Forests, Inc., 72 Idaho 291,240 P.2d 242 (1952).
(R. at 001666 (emphasis added).) The AG concluded in 1994: "[U]ntil the legislature makes
clear that cellular telephone users are to be taxed pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-4804, our advice
is that cellular telephone users should not be charged a telephone line user fee." (R. at 001667.)
Similar analysis and scrutiny is appropriate here. 3

D. The Collection and Remittance Obligation of "Telecommunications Providers"
The Act places the obligation upon "telecommunications providers" to collect the E911

3

See also TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Comm 'n on State Emergency Commc 'ns, 397 S.W.3d 173,
183 (Tex. 2013) (addressing a very similar case):
Judicial construction of tax statutes eschews fuzzy math. Legislators must speak clearly,
agencies heed assiduously, and courts review exactingly. Several cardinal, century-old
principles dictate strictness in tax matters: (1) tax authorities cannot collect something
that the law has not actually imposed; (2) imprecise statutes must be interpreted "most
strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen"; and (3) we will not extend
the reach of an ambiguous tax by implication, nor permit tax collectors to stretch the
scope of taxation beyond its clear bounds.
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tax from

purchaser of "access lines" in each county or 911 service area on a

basis:

The fee shall be imposed upon and collected from purchasers of access
lines or interconnected VoIP service lines ,vith a service address or place
of primary use within the county or 911 service area on a monthly basis by
all telecommunications providers of such services. The fee may be listed
as a separate item on customers' monthly bills.
LC. § 31-4804(2).
At issue in this appeal is whether TracFone, a non-licensed reseller of prepaid wireless
communications service, was unambiguously a "telecommunications provider" obligated to
collect the E91 l tax from its customers. The Act categorizes with specificity those entities that
fall under the relevant definition, and TracFone is not within any of those categories:
"Telecommunications provider" means any person providing:
(a) Exchange telephone service to a service address within this state; or
(b) Any wireless canier providing telecommunications service to any
customer having a place of primary use within this state; or
(c) Interconnected VoIP service to any customer having a place of
primary use within this state; or
(d) A provider of any other communications service that connects an
individual having either a service address or a place of primary use
within this state to an established public safety answering point by
dialing 911.
LC. § 31-4802(13). 4

Importantly, the Act narrows the entities which are deemed "wireless

carriers" under subsection (b) of the above definition, as follows:
"Wireless carrier" means a cellular licensee, a personal communications
service licensee, and certain specialized mobile radio providers designated
as covered carriers by the federal communications commission in 4 7 CFR
4

It is undisputed that TracFone does not provide exchange telephone service, nor VoIP (Voice

over Internet Protocol) service, and that it is therefore not among the class of
"telecommunications providers" discussed in either subsections (a) or (c). (R. at 001037.)
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20.18

successor to such rule.

LC. §31-4802(15). Whether TracFone clearly and unambiguously is a wireless carrier pursuant
to subsection (b) or provides "other communications service" pursuant to subsection (d) are the
primary questions before this Court. 5
E.

Procedural Posture

As noted, this appeal comes before the Court on an Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)
Certification of Final Judgment, as requested by TracFone on the basis that if this Court
disagrees with the conclusion of the District Court on the controlling issue of law, this case will
be fully resolved without the need for additional litigation. (R. at 002028.) Though the District
Court ultimately concluded that TracFone is clearly and unambiguously a "telecommunications
provider" as defined by the Act, the procedural history of these very proceedings and the
applicable law strongly suggest otherwise.
This case arises out of several years' worth of analysis of the Act's scope by the members
of the IECC, during which time there was a well-documented and uniform understanding that the
Act, as written, did not encompass prepaid wireless services. It was not until years after this
litigation commenced that the Idaho legislature finally, in 2013, amended the Act to specifically
include a collection obligation and mechanism for providers of prepaid wireless services. (See
Argument Section III, infra.)
Though the state-affiliated parties bore the burden in this case to demonstrate that Idaho

5

Whether subsection (b) applies to TracFone is the subject of the Counties' Cross-Appeal and is,
therefore, not yet briefed in this Opening Brief from Appellants.
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§ 31-4802(13) clearly and unambiguously classified TracFone, their attempts to understand
the plain language of the statute have consistently fallen short. On May 17, 2013, the IECC filed
its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. at 000330) and related documents (R. at 000334,
000517 and 000525), which was the state-affiliated parties' first attempt to suggest that the Act's
definition of an obligated "telecommunications provider" applied to TracFone based on the
faulty contention that TracFone was a provider of Specialized Mobile Radio services (SMRS) (as
noted, a term defined with specificity in the rules of the FCC). 6 The IECC stated:
TracFone is neither a cellular licensee nor a personal communications
service licensee. Therefore, in order to show that TracFone is a "wireless
carrier" and, thus, a "telecommunications provider" subject to the Fee
collection and remittance requirements of the Act, it must be shown that
TracFone is one of "certain specialized mobile radio providers designated
as covered carriers by 4 7 CFR 20 .18."
(R. at 000530.) As noted above, TracFone is not an SMR service provider under the FCC rules

and regulations, which fact TracFone proved in its Memorandum in Opposition to the IECC's
Motion. (R. at 000831.)
Apparently realizing the folly of their argument, the state-affiliated parties scrambled for
another basis to support their assertion that the Act clearly and unambiguously applied to
TracFone. In their Reply Memoranda filed on June 21, 2013 (R. at 000889 and 000914), the
state-affiliated parties gave themselves a "mulligan," by effectively abandoning their flawed

Ada County and the Idaho Association of Counties (on behalf of all other Idaho counties)
joined in the IECC's Motion, adopting wholesale what the IECC had authored and providing no
additional substantive commentary. (See R. at 000327 and 000546.)
6
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effort to categorize TracF one as an SMR service provider. 7 Instead, they altered their strategy to
interpret the supposedly clear and unambiguous statute and suggested, contrary to what they had
originally claimed "must be shown" to subject TracFone to the Act, that TracFone was a
"telecommunications provider" under subsection (d) ofidaho Code § 31-4802(13):
The first three categories are specific to exchange, wireless and VoIP
services, respectively. Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)(d), on the other hand,
functions as a catch-all to include providers of "any other communications
service" that connects a customer to 911 answering points in Idaho.
(R. at 000918 (emphasis added).)

By this time, the state-affiliated parties were already

contradicting themselves. In its Statement of Undisputed Facts in support of the original effort
on summary judgment, the IECC had already acknowledged that "TracFone is a ·wireless reseller
that provides prepaid wireless telecommunications service." (R. at 000518.)
Due to the fact that the state-affiliated parties had fundamentally changed the basis of
their argument on summary judgment within their Reply briefing, TracFone objected (R. at
000955 and 000972) and the District Court agreed, granting TracFone an opportunity to file a
Sur-Reply to the new arguments and evidence submitted by the state-affiliated parties in
violation of I.R.C.P. 56(c). (Tr. 6/28/2013, pp. 6:14

7:21.)

TracFone filed its Sur-Reply on

July 12, 2013. (R. at 001005.)
In the August 26, 2013 Memorandum Decision, the District Court rightfully agreed that
TracFone was not a "wireless carrier" under the Act. (R. at 001037-42.) Because TracFone is
The Idaho Association of Counties did not file a Reply Memorandum at that time. However,
the state ofldaho, in direct violation ofldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) and without
obtaining prior permission from the District Court to do so, filed a Second Affidavit of its
counsel along with its Reply Brief. (R. at 000923.)
7
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neither a cellular

a personal communications

radio provider as regulated by the FCC, it is not among the class of "wireless carriers" obligated
to collect and pay the E911 fee under subsection (b) of the definition of "telecommunications
carrier." (R. at 001037-1042.)
However, despite the fact that the state-affiliated parties had already acknowledged that
TracFone operates only in the field of wireless communications service, and that in order for
TracFone to be deemed an obligated "telecommunications provider," it "must be shown" that
TracFone was a "wireless carrier" according to Idaho Code §§ 31-4802(13)(b) and (15), the
District Court granted partial summary judgment to the state-affiliated parties on their second
interpretation of the statute's allegedly clear and unambiguous language. (R. at 001042-1048.)
The District Court adopted the state-affiliated parties' second analysis, and determined that the
Act clearly and unambiguously applied to TracFone because the prepaid wireless
telecommunications service sold by TracFone was an "other communications service," within
the ambit of Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)(d): "Because prepaid wireless service provided by an
unlicensed entity like TracFone does not fall under any of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of section
31-4802(13), sellers of such service are clearly providers of a communications service other than
those enumerated in the statute, and subsection (d) applies." (R. at 1044 (emphasis in original).)
In concluding that TracFone was "clearly" among the class of service providers
contemplated by the Legislature in drafting subsection (d), the District Court committed a serious
contradiction in its reasoning. Earlier in the same Memorandum Decision, the District Court had
properly recognized "that nothing in the definition of 'telecommunications provider' contained at
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31-4802(13) makes anv reference to a provider's billing methods; the focus of each
seoarate definition is on what a provider does. not how it charges." (R. at 001035 (emphasis
added).) Directly contradicting that acknowledgment of the plain language of the statute, the
District Court nevertheless ruled that subsection (d) applied to TracFone's wireless services
precisely because of its prepaid payment method. Even though it was not able to identify
anything about TracFone's wireless service that distinguished it from other wireless carriers'
post-paid services, the District Court placed TracFone within the ambit of the Act on the sole
basis of "how it charges." (Compare R. at 001043 (referring to TracFone as a "provider of
wireless service"), with R. at 001042-1048 (lacking any substantive analysis of what TracFone
"does" that is different than other wireless providers, other than to sell those same services using
a prepaid "billing method").)
Due in part to the foregoing contradictions in the District Court's analysis, as well as the
District Court's impermissible speculation as to the Act's purpose (instead of its plain language)
(R. at 001046), TracFone moved for the District Court's reconsideration. (R. at 001064, 1068,

1102 and 1673 (Motion and supporting documents).) On Reconsideration, TracFone argued that
the plain language of the statute, including the structure of subsections (a) through (d), did not
encompass TracFone, regardless of what the District Court might have guessed the Legislature
had intended, and that any attempt to shoehorn TracFone under the purview of subsection (d)
was burdened by an impermissible disregard for the plain rules of statutory construction and
English grammar. (R. at 001673.) Either subsection (d) plainly and unambiguously did not apply
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to a prepaid reseller

wireless services,

that

wireless services were addressed by

subsection (b), or this imprecisely-drafted taxing statute was ambiguous. 8 (Id.)
To support the contention that the plain language of the statute was not so plain and
unambiguous that a non-licensed reseller of prepaid wireless services would be clearly obligated
under either subsection (b) or (d), TracF one submitted an Affidavit in support of its Motion that
included a history of the IECC' s O\Vn Minutes of its monthly meetings. (R. at 001102.) The sole
purpose of TracFone's submission of this evidence was to demonstrate that the problematic
language of the statute as \Vritten, if not unambiguously inapplicable to TracFone, was at a
minimum susceptible to multiple, reasonable interpretations; at best, it was ambiguous. (R. at
001692-1705.) These Minutes demonstrate that, for years preceding this litigation, even the
members of the state commission tasked with administering the Act did not believe that the Act,
as written, covered prepaid wireless services. 9

For example, the IECC Minutes from the

8

One of the problems with the District Court's reading of the statute is that it creates two taxing
obligations for a single access line: First, the FCC licensee that provides the wireless access line
(e.g. Verizon Wireless) would be obligated to collect the E9 l l tax under subsection (b ); second,
the prepaid reseller of the same wireless access line would be obligated to collect and remit the
E9 l l tax under subsection (d). The District Court does not resolve this conflict, except to
extrapolate that the Act "contemplates that the service provider closest in proximitv to the phone
user in the chain of commerce will collect the fee each month .... " (R. at 001045.) The District
Court was not able to cite any statutory language supporting that reading, i.e. that would relieve
an obligee under one subsection if another obligee was "closer in proximity" to the end user.
Under TracFone's suggested interpretation of the Act, discussed herein, there would never be
such an occasion where there was more than one statutory obligee on a single access line.
9

Also at issue in this appeal, the District Court granted the state-affiliated parties' motions to
strike the Affidavit of TracFone's counsel on reconsideration, which included the IECC's
meeting Minutes (R. at 001842), and rejected the additional argument from TracFone that when
the Legislature amended the Act in 2013 to specifically address prepaid (which it did with
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February, 2010

meeting

a n unmistakeable discussion about the need to pass

legislation to address the prepaid industry, in order to "pick[] up the citizens that aren't
contributing now." (R. at 001530.) Despite this universal recognition by the IECC, through as
late as 2010, that the Idaho Act did not apply to prepaid, the IECC filed its counterclaim in this
litigation, seeking nine (9) years' worth of allegedly-owed back taxes. (R. at 000023-25.) In
response to TracFone's Affidavit attaching the IECC's own meeting minutes, the state-affiliated
parties (excepting the IECC) filed Motions to Strike those Minutes. (R. at 001720, 1756.)
On

Reconsideration,

with

TracFone

highlighting

the

District

Court's

pnor

acknowledgement that an entity's billing methods were not discussed in the Act, and therefore
that the prepaid nature of TracFone' s wireless communications service could not be the basis for
it being a provider of "other communications service" under subsection (d), the District Court yet
again altered the analysis of this supposedly plain and unambiguous statute in its December 31,
2013 Memorandum Decision. (R. at 001838.)

According to the District Court's modified

reasoning after reconsideration, the Act allegedly clearly and unambiguously applies to
TracFone because, unlike its licensed counterparts providing the exact same wireless service
over the same airwaves, TracFone resells its services to its customers, notwithstanding the
failure of the District Court to identify even a single functional difference between wireless
service provided over network facilities which the provider owns and otherwise identical service

TracFone's assistance), it gave rise to a presumption under Leonard Construction Company v.
State ex rel State Tax Commission, 96 Idaho 893, 896, 539 P.2d 246, 249 (1975), that the prior
iteration of the Act had not included any distinct obligation for resellers of prepaid services.
TracFone respectfully appeals each of these decisions, as well.
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provided on a resale basis. (R. at

Indeed, the District Court contradicted its own

conclusion that resold service is somehow an "other communications service" by acknowledging
that "Tracfone is correct that the service it provides is the same as that provided by a licensed
carrier." (Id.) Moving away from its prior position that the Act "clearly" applied to TracFone
because its service is prepaid, and its recognition that the focus of the Act was on the service
provided and not the business model or payment mechanism employed by the reseller, the
District Court now concluded "wireless service provided by an unlicensed reseller (whether on a
prepaid or postpaid basis) is nevertheless an 'other communications service' as compared to
wireless service provided by a licensed seller." (Id. (emphasis added).)
This Court need look no further than this history of the shifting positions of the stateaffiliated parties and the District Court to conclude that the Act's tax collection and remittance
obligations were anything but clear and unambiguous with respect to TracFone (and any similar
non-licensed resellers of prepaid wireless services). TracFone does not provide an "other
communications service." Rather, it resells the same wireless service covered by subsection (b ).
The District Court's application of subsection (d) was in error, both when it initially
reasoned that TracFone was a provider of "other communications service" because its service
was prepaid, and later when it took its own "mulligan" by changing its mind on reconsideration
to conclude that TracFone provided an "other communications service" because its wireless
services are resold.

As the District Court acknowledged, the plain language of the statute

"distinguishes service types based upon such things as the type of medium through which the
raw information is transmitted (e.g. landline, radio transmissions, Internet traffic, etc)," and not
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billing method or business model of the

(R. at 001848.) TracFone's

type is

exclusively the sort of "radio transmissions" addressed in subsection (b) (even though TracFone
itself is not a "wireless carrier" according to the Act's narrowing definition). Thus, the District
Court's ultimate conclusion that TracFone is a telecommunications provider of "other
communications service" under the Act, by virtue of either the prepaid or the resold nature of its
sales, is directly contrary to its O"WTI acknowledgement of the plain language of the Act.
Given this extensive history of the inability of both the state-affiliated parties and the
District Court to find one, consistent, plain and straightforward way to show how the Act clearly
and unambiguously placed TracFone into the Act's definition of "telecommunications provider,"
using the plain and literal language of the Act, TracFone respectfully submits that, regardless of
what guesses anyone could make about what the Legislature's intent might have been in enacting
its various amendments to the Act, well-established rules of statutory interpretation dictate a
finding that the pre-2013 version of the Act imposed no obligation on non-licensed resellers of
prepaid wireless service to collect and remit E911 taxes. Additionally, in conjunction with the
fact that LC. § 31-4802(13)(b) clearly and unambiguously does not apply to TracFone, as
properly determined by the District Court, the manner in which subsection (d) of the definition of
"telecommunications provider" was read by the District Court created ambiguity and obscurity in
the statute too great to permit the same to be applied to TracFone, as such ambiguity must be
construed strictly against the taxing authorities seeking to enforce and benefit from it.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
1) Whether the District Court erred when it found that prepaid wireless service \Vas
unambiguously an "other communications service" under Idaho Code§ 31-4802(13)(d)?
2) Whether the District Court erred when it found that resold wireless service \Vas
unambiguously an "other communications service" under Idaho Code § 31-4802(13 )( d)?
3) Whether the District Court erred when it resorted to canons of statutory interpretation to
ascertain the intent of the Legislature on drafting Idaho Code § 31-4802(13) before it
determined whether the statute was ambiguous? 10
4) Whether the District Court erred in failing to recognize that TracFone's reading of Idaho
Code § 31-4802 was, at a minimum and based upon the plain and literal statutory
language, a reasonable interpretation of the statute, such that the District Court's
subsequent and differing interpretation could be, at best, only a second reasonable
interpretation, thereby necessarily creating ambiguity in the statutory definition of
"telecommunications provider"?
5) Whether the District Court erred in striking certain evidence submitted by TracFone in
support of its- Motion for Reconsideration, which demonstrated the reasonableness of
TracFone's reading of the statutory language by demonstrating that the Respondents
historically viewed the statute as inapplicable to TracFone, also?
6) Whether TracFone is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal?
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"This Court exercises free review over questions of statutory interpretation and
application." Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Eisenman, 153 Idaho 549, 552, 286 P.3d
185, 188 (2012) (citing Flying Elk Inv., LLC v. Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9, 15, 232 P.3d 330, 336
(2010)). This Court has had multiple opportunities in recent years to discuss the standard of

See In re Adoption of Doe, 156 Idaho 345, 326 P.3d 347 (2014) (Rules of statutory
construction are "inapplicable when a statute is unambiguous, because in that case, 'the clearly
expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court
to consider rules of statutory construction."') (citing Payette River Property Owners Assn. v. Bd.
ofCommrs. of Valley Cnty., 132 Idaho 551,557,976 P.2d 477,483 (1999)).
10
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in cases of statutory interpretation:
On review, "[a]n unambiguous statute must be given its plain, usual, and
ordinary meaning. Statutory provisions should not be read in isolation but
instead are interpreted in the context of the entire document." Id. "A
statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one
reasonable construction." Hayden Lake Fire Prat. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141
Idaho 388, 398, 111 P.3d 73, 83 (2005) (quotation omitted), rev'd on other
grounds by Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 152 Idaho 495, 272 P.3d 467
(2012).
Eisenman, 153 Idaho at 552. As has been further explained by this Court:

The objective of statutory construction is to derive the intent of the
legislature. Kelso v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 134, 997 P.2d 591,
595 (2000). Statutory construction begins with the literal language of
the statute. D & M Country Estates Homeowners Ass 'n v. Romriell, 138
Idaho 160, 165, 59 P.3d 965, 970 (2002). \Vhere a statute is
unambiguous, statutory construction is unnecessary and courts are
free to apply the plain meaning. Martin v. State Farm lvfut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 138 Idaho 244, 246, 61 P.3d 601, 603 (2002). Ambiguity occurs
where reasonable minds might differ as to interpretations. State v.
Browning, 123 Idaho 748, 749, 852 P.2d 500, 501 (Ct.App.1993) . . . .
Generally, interpretations that could lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh
results are disfavored.
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307,312, 109 P.3d 161, 166 (2005) (emphasis

added). See also Beers v. Corp. of President of Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 155
Idaho 680, 316 P .3d 92, 104 (2013) (where this Court refused to extend a legal duty where the
relevant "statute does not impose a duty" by its plain language); Stringer v. Robinson, 15 5 Idaho
554,314 P.3d 609,613 (Nov. 27, 2013) (citing Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 66,294 P.3d 184,
192 (2013) ("We decline to do violence to the plain language of I.C. § 5-215 in the name of
uniformity .... [W]e are not at liberty to depart from the plain meaning of a statute for policy
reasons.")); Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011). "In
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determining the ordinary meaning of a statute, 'effect must be given to all the words

the

statute if possible, so that none will be void. superfluous. or redundant."' State v. ,Mercer, 143
Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308,309 (2006) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
"The literal words of the statute 'must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning;
... [i]f the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as
written."' In re Adoption of Doe, 156 Idaho at_, 326 P.3d at 351 (quoting City of Sandpoint v.

Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69, 72 P.3d 905, 909 (2003).) Rules of
statutory construction are "inapplicable when a statute is ambiguous, because in that case, 'the
clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for
a court to consider rules of statutory construction."' Id. (quoting Payette River Property Owners

Assn., 132 Idaho at 557; see also Verska, 151 Idaho at 893 ("If the statute is not ambiguous, this
Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.").
Crucial to this appeal, this Court has previously determined that "[t]he asserted purpose
for enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain meaning." Verska, 151 Idaho at 892-893.
Rather, the Courts "must follow the law as written. If it is socially or economically unsound, the
power to correct it is legislative, not judicial." Id. at 895 (citing Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335,
393 P.2d 35 (1964). Clarifying a line of cases that had misinterpreted the rules of statutory
construction and interpretation (including McNeal v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm 'n, 142 Idaho 685,
132 P.2d 442 (2006), relied upon by the Idaho Association of Counties below (R. at 001749)),
this Court stated in Verska that it has "never revised or voided an unambiguous statute on the
ground that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results when construed as written, and
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we do not have the authority to do so." Id at 896. "The public policy of legislative enactments
cannot be questioned by the courts and voided simply because the courts might not agree with
the public policy so announced." Id. (citation omitted). "Indeed, the contention that we could
revise an unambiguous statute because we believed it \Vas absurd or would produce absurd
results is itself illogical." Id. "If the only reasonable interpretation were determined to have an
absurd result, what other interpretation would be adopted?" Id. Regardless of whether the stateaffiliated parties or the District Court determined that the purpose of the Act was to be broader
than the way in which the plain and literal language reads is simply irrelevant.
Finally, the Idaho Legislature has codified certain principles of statutory interpretation.
"The language of a statute should be given its plain, usual and ordinary meaning. Where a statute
is clear and unambiguous, the expressed intent of the legislature shall be given effect without

engaging in statutory construction. The literal words of a statute are the best guide to
determining legislative intent." LC.§ 73-113(1) (emphasis added). The Legislature has expressly
instructed that words with particular legal meanings must be read according to those meanings:
"[T]echnical words and phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate

meaning in law, or are defined in the succeeding section, are to be construed according to such
peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition." LC.§ 73-113(3) (emphasis added).
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred When It Determined That Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)(d)
Applies to TracFone.
Despite the fact that even the state-affiliated parties were apparently unable to read a
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clear

unambiguous application of

Act to TracFone based upon the literal words of the

statute, and were therefore forced to shift their argument and depart from their first assertion that
TracFone was a "specialized mobile radio provider," the District Court somehow found that
subsection (d) clearly and unambiguously applied to TracFone. Because the District Court's
own analysis was tortured and itself had to be revised in a strained effort to justify how a plainly
inapplicable statute could be read to "clearly and unambiguously" apply to TracFone, TracFone
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's application of the Act to
TracFone in all regards. TracFone will address both of the District Court's divergent rationales.
a. The District Court's Application of Section 31-4802(13)(d) based on the fact that
TracFone's Wireless Service is Provided on a Prepaid Basis was in Error.

In the District Court's Memorandum Decision granting Partial Summary Judgment to the
state-affiliated parties, the District Court correctly recognized that statutes must not be read in
isolation, but instead must be viewed in the context of the statutory scheme as a whole. (R. at
001031 (citingGibsonv. Bennett, 141 Idaho 270, 108P.3d417(Ct.App.2005).) 11 Based on the
sentence structure and the language used before the colon in the multi-faceted definition of
"telecommunications provider," as well as the structure of subsections (a) and (c), the proper
reading of the literal words of the definition describes types of telecommunications service that
11

Though TracFone will endeavor to weigh the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations
and, later, to prove the true legislative intent behind the 2007 amendments, it maintains its
position that such an analysis is unnecessary upon a showing that a taxing statute, such as the one
at issue in this litigation, is ambiguous. "It is a long-standing rule of construction that tax
statutes granting the right to tax are strictly construed against the taxing authority and in favor of
the taxpayer with any ambiguities to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer." Goodman Oil Co. of
Lewiston v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 136 Idaho 53, 55, 28 P.3d 996, 998 (2001).
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are

the marketplace, according to the

of information transmission that is

utilized for each service type. It is therefore appropriate to read the Legislature's intent to have
covered in the definition of "telecommunications provider" those entities that provide the
following types of service:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Exchange (wireline) service; or
Wireless telecommunications service; or
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service; or
Any other communications service.

The District Court ultimately agreed that this is the way that the statute must be read (R. at
001848), as did at least two of the three groups of state-affiliated parties (R. at 001737-38 (Ada
County: "If an entity provides a communications service other than those contained in
subsections (a), (b) and (c) ... , then that entity is a telecommunications provider .... "); R. at
001752 (IAC: "Rather, the plain meaning of subsection (d) is to cover any kind of service ...
that was not already covered in subsections (a) through (c).").

Under this interpretation,

according to the undisputed facts in this litigation, the only type of telecommunications service
which TracFone provides (wireless) is encompassed within subsection (b). The District Court
committed reversible error when it nevertheless determined that TracFone's wireless services
could be shoehorned into the plainly inapplicable subsection (d), simply because TracFone
provides that wireless services on a prepaid basis. (R. at 001044.)
There is and can be no disagreement that TracFone provides wireless telecommunications
service, specifically, cellular service. In fact, in its initial efforts to place TracFone within
subsection (b) of the definition, the IECC vehemently argued that TracFone is a "provider of
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wireless services." (R. at 000526, 000528 (emphasis

The District Court also

reached this same conclusion, referring to TracFone as "a provider of wireless service." (R. at
001043.) This point is not in dispute.
However, in conflict with the District Court's initial conclusion that "it is clear that
prepaid wireless service is precisely the kind of 'other' communications service intended to be
captured by subsection (d)," (R. at 001045), the District Court noted early in its Memorandum
Decision that "nothing in the definition of 'telecommunications provider' . . . makes anv
reference to a provider's billing methods; the focus of each separate definition is on what a
provider does. not how it charges" (R. at 001035 (emphasis added).) What TracFone does is
resell

wireless telecommunications

service;

how TracFone charges

telecommunications service is by a prepaid method.

for

its wireless

Contrary to the District Court's final

conclusion, but following the logic of the District Court's own earlier observation, the fact that
TracFone charges for its wireless telecommunications service on a prepaid basis does not render
its wireless telecommunications service an "other communications service" to be encompassed
by subsection (d) of the definition. It is still wireless service. 12

An appropriate analogy can be made to the line of cases addressing federal excise taxes on
long-distance charges, which addressed "whether a statute imposing a tax on telephone calls for
which the toll charge 'varies in amount with the distance and elapsed transmission time of each
individual communication' covers long-distance telephone charges varying by time but not by
distance." National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. US., 431 F.3d. 374 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Where the
legislature had specifically and unambiguously established the criteria for application of the tax,
courts universally determined that the tax could not be imposed upon long-distance calls that did
not vary by both time and distance. See also Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. US., 408 F.3d 1328
(2005). "A legislature that chooses to define eligibility for taxation based on how a private entity
12
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Legislature clearly defined "telecommunications provider" according to the types
services provided by such a person/entity (e.g., "wireless telecommunications service"), there
can be no dispute that the type of service that TracFone offers is not encompassed by subsection
(d), but rather falls squarely and unambiguously within the ambit of subsection (b ).

It is

unmistakable error, under the District Court's own analysis, to place TracFone within subsection
(d) merely because it charges for its wireless service on a prepaid basis. It is similarly
inappropriate to contort the Act's definitional sections to attempt to achieve a harmony with what
the District Court perceived to be the legislative purpose and intent when that harmony is not
fulfilled by the literal language of the Act, given that TracFone does not meet the statutory
definition of "wireless carrier." See Viking Constr., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist., 149 Idaho
187, 191-192, 233 p.3d 118, 122-23 (2010) ("The asserted purpose for enacting the legislation
cannot modify its plain meaning."); Grazer, 154 Idaho at 66 ("[W]e are not at liberty to depart
from the plain meaning of a statute for policy reasons."). See also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Alabama
Dep 't of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101, 1114, 179 L. Ed. 2d 3 7 (2011) ("Alabama's preference for

symmetry cannot trump an asymmetrical statute. And its preference for the greatest possible
latitude to levy taxes cannot trump Congress's decision to restrict discriminatory taxation of rail
carriers.'). (Contra R. at 001046 ("To be sure, the foregoing analysis extrapolates much from a
single (albeit critical) subsection of sections 31-4804, but it is also consonant with the Act

chooses to charge for the service ... can hardly be treated as a body that means to impose a tax
for all time." OfficeMax, Inc. v. US., 428 F.3d 583 (6 th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original).
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construed as a whole, particularly in light of the legislature's statement of purpose codified at
section 31-4801.").) The Supreme Court of the United States is in accord:
But this Court does not revise legislation ... just because the text as
written creates an apparent anomaly as to some subject it does not address.
Truth be told, such anomalies often arise from statutes, if for no other
reason than that Congress typically legislates by parts-addressing one
thing without examining all others that might merit comparable treatment.
... This Court has no roving license, in even ordinary cases of statutory
interpretation, to disregard clear language simply on the view that .
Congress "must have intended" something broader.

Michigan v. Bay A1ills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2033-34, 188 L. Ed. 2d 1071 (2014).
Very recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed an exceedingly similar question
regarding the applicability of its state 911 fee statute to providers of prepaid wireless services.

See

Virgin Mobile

US.A.,

L.P v.

Com.

ex rel.

Commercial lvfobile Radio Serv.

Telecommunications Bd., 2012-SC-000621-DG, 2014 WL 4116480 (Ky. Aug. 21, 2014).
Overturning a Kentucky Court of Appeals case that had been relied upon by the Sixth Circuit in
a prior decision against TracFone (effectively overturning that Sixth Circuit decision (Id., n.5),
the Kentucky Court similarly examined the literal words of its statutory scheme.13 Id. Following
the canons of statutory interpretation cited herein, the Kentucky Virgin Court concluded, "It is
neither the duty nor the prerogative of the judiciary to breathe into the statute that which the
Legislature has not put there." Id. Analyzing its state's statute which, like Idaho's, has been

13

The Sixth Circuit decision that has now been disregarded by the Kentucky Supreme Court as
the proper analysis of Kentucky state law was previously relied upon by the state-affiliated
parties in support of their first effort on summary judgment, likening the Idaho Act to the
Kentucky statute. (R. at 000542.)
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at various times

enactment,

Kentucky Supreme Court explained

courts do not have the po\ver to bridge any perceived gaps between legislative intent and
unambiguous statutory language:
It is certainly reasonable to suppose that back in 1998, the General
Assembly intended for all mobile telephone uses to have 911-emergency
service and to pay for that service by way of the CMRS service charge.
But, just as the 1984 General Assembly did not anticipate the advent of
wireless mobile telephone service when it enacted the special tax for local
911-emergency service, the 1998 General Assembly did not anticipate the
advent of prepaid wireless service, and it failed to provide for that
unforeseen development.

Id In a highly analogous explanation of its decision, the Kentucky Supreme Court explained its
adherence to the literal language of its statute:
The legislature could have spoken with regard to the collection of CMRS
service charges in general terms broad enough to have enacted a statute
flexible enough[I 4 J to accommodate even unforeseen technological or
commercial developments. It could have expressed a broad intention that
every CMRS service provider, not just "billing providers," had to adopt
some means to collect the fee. It did not do so. e cannot ignore or wish
away the presence of the specific words that the legislature did use.

,v

Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, this Court cannot "ignore or wish away" the legislature's clear

and unambiguous narrowing of the class of wireless service providers obligated under the Act.
Reading the statute as a whole, it is evident that the Legislature wrote the statute to
address wireless telecommunications service within subsection (b ), and to address any other

14

(Contrast R. at 002032 (District Court finding that the Act applies to TracFone even though its
application as such is not practical: " ... Tracfone's arguments are certainly not frivolous. The
Court also has been quite frank in its orders in acknowledging that while the Act unambiguously
applies to Tracfone, the Act's monthly fee-collection schedule is nowhere near flexible enough
to realistically accommodate prepaid business models, like that employed by Tracfone.").)
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types

service by way of subsections

(c)

Nowhere in the

and literal language

of the statute did the Legislature place any emphasis on or give any attention to the payment
methods that a customer could utilize in order to obtain those services. It is also evident that,
within the wireless subset of telecommunications service, the Legislature explicitly obligated
only those entities that it expressly identified in Idaho Code § 31-4802(15), i.e., those who are
within the statutory definition of "wireless carrier." Regardless of whether the District Court
viewed the draftsmanship of the Legislature to have accomplished its perceived intent of the Act,
the fact is that the Legislature "wrote the statute it wrote." CSXTransp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 1114.
Though the IECC correctly noted in its original summary judgment motion (R. at
000525) that provisions of a statute cannot be read in isolation, and that they must be considered
alongside the rest of the statute so as to not render any particular aspect of a statute superfluous
or redundant, the argument later advanced by the state-affiliated parties and adopted by the
District Court plainly violates that principle.

See State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho at 109. By

interpreting Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)(d) as a "catch-all" provision to effectively include 'any
other providers of communications service,' regardless of whether an entity's offered
communications services were already addressed in subsections (a) through (c), the District
Court ran far afoul of the rules of statutory construction. No longer would the legislature's clear
and plain limitation of what constitutes a "wireless carrier" have any significance, as subsection
(d) would render those limitations void and superfluous in favor of a reading of the Act that
places the collection and remittance obligation upon any seller of the wireless service described
in subsection (b ), regardless of whether that seller is a "wireless carrier" based upon the
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characteristics

identified in section 31

15).

In other words, in the field of wireless telecommunications service, despite the fact that
the Legislature specifically wrote the Act to apply only to a "cellular licensee," "personal
communications service licensee," and "certain specialized mobile radio providers," the initial
conclusion of the District Court ignores those specific classifications and does not apply the
specific limiting effects they have in the statute. Instead subsection (d) was read by the District
Court to open the Act to the entire universe of entities that could possibly fall \Vithin what the
District Court and the state-affiliated parties deemed to be the "purview," "purpose" or "intent"
of the Act. All of the specific limitations set forth in the definition of "wireless carrier" become
moot, as they are swallowed in their entirety by the alleged "catch-all" provision in subsection
(d). Indeed, the Court must question - if subsection (d) was intended to be, as the District Court
determined, a "catch-all" definition - why did the Legislature spend any time or energy
delineating the specific language set forth in subsections (a), (b) and (c), and in§ 31-4802(15)?
With the maxim in mind that "effect must be given to all the words of the statute if possible, so
that none will be void. superfluous, or redundant," Mercer, 143 Idaho at 109, the District Court's
reading is simply untenable.
A second problem arises by the manner in which the District Court interpreted the
supposed "catch-all" language of subsection (d): that reading ignores the legislature's explicit
use of the word "other."

The alleged "catch-all" provision is plainly \\Titten to apply to

"provider[s] of any other communications service ... " in the state of Idaho. The Court should
note that subsection (d) refers to "provider[s] of any other communications service," and not
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providers of

service." Missing

important distinction, the state-

affiliated parties and the District Court below ignored the fact that subsections (a) through (c) of
the definition of "telecommunications provider" already identify certain, specific types of
"communications service" to which the Act applies; to wit, "[ e]xchange telephone service,"
"wireless ... telecommunications service," and "[i]nterconnected VoIP service." A plain reading
of subsection (d), which gives meaningful effect to all ,vords and context of the statute, requires
the term "other" to be read to pertain to "communications services" that fall outside the scope of
those preceding subsections. Accord CSX Transp., Inc. v. Alabama Dep't of Revenue, 131 S. Ct.
1101, 1107, 179 L. Ed. 2d 37 (2011) ("[A]nother tax," as used in subsection (b)(4), is best
understood to refer to all of these-more precisely, to encompass any form of tax a State might
impose, on any asset or transaction, except the taxes on property previously addressed in
subsections (b)(l)-(3).") (citing Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Superior, 932 F.2d 1185, 1186
(C.A. 7 1991 )). Contrary to the rules of statutory construction and interpretation, the implication
of the District Court's conclusion results in a reading of subsection (d) that swallows the
communications services already covered in the preceding subsections. See Id. ("Even if the 4-R
Act were ambiguous, we doubt we would interpret subsection (b )(4) to replicate each facet of
subsections (b )(1 )-(3 ). "). This reading cannot stand.
Based upon the foregoing, the only way to read Idaho Code§ 31-4802(13)(d) in a way
that does not erase meaningful language of the Act is to give the words the plain meaning that
they have. The term "other" calls upon communications services that are not already covered by
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subsections (a), (b) and (c) of Idaho Code § 31-4802(13). 15

These

definitional

provisions are clear and unambiguous, and simply do not apply to TracFone - a non-licensed
reseller of wireless telecommunications service offered on a prepaid basis.
The undisputed record demonstrates that TracFone resells wireless telecommunications
services on a prepaid basis, which it acquires from FCC wireless licensees that are already
covered by the Act under subsection (b ). \Vith the District Court's acknowledgement that
"nothing in the definition of 'telecommunications provider' . . . makes any reference to a
provider's billing methods" (R. at 001035), it was reversible error under the well-settled rules
governing statutory construction to apply subsection (d) to TracFone on the basis that
TracFone's wireless services are sold on a prepaid basis. The plain meaning of the word "other,"
when considering the statute as a whole, cannot properly be read to re-till the ground already
covered by subsections (a) through (c). See CSX Transport, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 1107. All of the
services TracFone provides are subsumed within the subject matter covered by subsection 13(b)
of Idaho Code § 31-4802 but, since TracFone is not a cellular or personal communications
service licensee, it is not an entity to which the fee collection and remittance obligations of Idaho
Code § 31-4804 can apply. Regardless of what may have been the legislature's intent, the plain
language of the Act simply does not place a fee collection and remittance obligation upon
TracFone for its sale of prepaid wireless services.

15

It is not necessary for this Court to determine what, exactly, may be covered under subsection
(d) of the definition of "telecommunications provider." The only logical interpretation is that the
Legislature intended to proactively address the prospect of evolving technology that does not
utilize the landline, radio, or internet services that are addressed in LC.§ 31-4802(13)(a)-(c).
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Court's Application
Section -4802(13)(d) based on
Wireless Service is Resold was Error.

that

The District Court's alternate/secondary rationale for concluding that the Act "clearly and
unambiguously" places the tax collection and remittance obligation on TracFone - that
TracFone's services are resold - suffers the same fatal analysis as the District Court's reliance on
the prepaid aspect of TracFone's services.

On TracFone's Motion for Reconsideration, the

District Court acknowledged the internal contradiction and inconsistent reasoning in its initial
summary judgment opinion - that the statute does not address billing methods, but that TracFone
nevertheless provided an "other communications service" precisely because it provides its
wireless service on a prepaid basis. (R. at 00184 7 ("Having said as much, the Court does feel
that its order could have been improved .... ").) Though the District Court did not overtly admit
that it was retracting the previous determination that the prepaid nature of TracFone's service
was the deciding factor in shoehorning it into subsection (d), it implicitly did so through its new
reasoning as to how TracFone should fall under subsection (d):
That said, under the statutory scheme extensively developed in the Court's
order, wireless service provided by an unlicensed reseller (whether on a
prepaid or postpaid basis) is nevertheless an "other communications
service" as compared to wireless service provided by a licensed seller.
(R. at 001847.) By suggesting that TracFone provides an "other" service by reselling wireless
service "whether on a prepaid or postpaid basis," the District Court acknowledged that its own
first effort at reading the statute to "clearly and unambiguously" apply to TracFone was flawed.
Thus, the District Court shifted its reasoning for subjecting TracFone to the fee collection and
remittance obligations under the act, due solely to the fact that TracFone "resell[ s]" its wireless
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that, "[w]hether schooled
in the intricacies of the English language or not, no reasonable person could argue that these
sentences are well-written or free from error." (R. at

1852.) The District Court knew at that

time that its analysis could not be justified by the plain language of the Act.
However, even according to its revised interpretation of the Act, the District Court
committed yet another contradiction in reasoning. Though the District Court in one aspect of the
decision on Reconsideration noted that the Act "distinguishes service types based upon things
such as the type of medium through which the raw information is transmitted (e.g. landline, radio
transmissions, Internet traffic, etc[.])," the modified reasoning it provided as to how TracFone is
clearly and unambiguously a covered telecommunications provider did not look at all to "the

medium through which the raw information is transmitted." (R. at 001848.) Rather, the District
Court looked to how TracFone "sells its own branded handsets, sells minutes and/or airtime in
particular locations by particular methods, maintains its own customer communications and
customer service apparatus, and offers billing arrangementsP 61 that may or may not be available
from a licensed carrier." (Id.)
TracFone respectfully submits that there is thus an inherent contradiction in the reasoning
provided by the District Court, which warrants reversal. For many of the same and similar
reasons that the District Court committed reversible error with respect to its emphasis on

16

One is left to wonder what "billing arrangements" the District Court had in mind. As a
provider of prepaid wireless service only, TracFone does not render bills for its services and has
no such "billing arrangements."
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TracFone's prepaid billing method, such as ignoring

term

and/or otherwise rendering

moot and superfluous the important limitations in the definition of "v,·ireless carrier," the District
Court's modified reasoning fails to adhere to the canons governing statutory interpretation and
must be reversed. How the Act clearly and unambiguously applies to TracFone has yet to be
shmvn by any party or the District Court without resorting to irrelevant aspects of TracFone's
business (billing methods - or lack thereof, handset branding, etc.), which aspects are undeniably
absent from the plain language of the Act. 17 Among the differing opinions heretofore expressed,
none have actually focused on what the District Court acknowledged \Vas the impetus of the Act
- "the medium through which the raw information is transmitted." 18 For these reasons, the plain
language of the Act unambiguously assigns its fee collection and remittance obligations

Additionally, the prov1s10n of handsets, like other customer-ov.'Iled telecommunications
equipment (sometimes called customer premises equipment or CPE), is not telecommunications
service and has not been deemed such since 1980 when the FCC determined that provision of
CPE was not common carrier service and was not subject to regulation as such. See Amendment
of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77
FCC 2d 384 (1980); recon. 84 FCC 2d 50 (1980);/urther recon. 88 FCC 2d 512 (1981); ajf'd
sub nom. Computer and Communications Industry Association v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir.
1982), cert. den., 46 l U.S. 93 8 (1983 ).
17

Further buttressing TracFone's argument that it does not provide an "other communications
service" is the FCC' s use of a "functional equivalency" test to determine whether certain services
are "like communications services" for purposes of the nondiscrimination provisions of the
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 202. See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC,
917 F.2d 30 (1990). According to that test, in determining whether one communications service
is "like" another, "the FCC must look to the nature of the services offered and determine if
customers perceive them as performing the same functions. If customers regard[] the ... service
as the same, with cost considerations being the sole determining criterion, the services are like."
917 F .2d at 39 (internal citations omitted). Nothing in the record of this case supports the notion
that consumers perceive the functions of resold service differently than service provided by
entities which use their own network facilities.
18
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according to the type of service offered, and

reason (the wisdom

lS

not for the courts to decide), the plain language of the Act demonstrates that the legislature opted
to limit the class of entities responsible for collecting the E91 l tax on wireless services to those
explicitly identified under Idaho Code§ 31-4802(15) - a class that does not include TracFone

even though TracFone offers exclusively wireless service.
II.

If The Court Concludes That Section 31-4802 Does Not Unambiguously Omit NonLicensed Providers Of Wireless Sen·ice, Then It Must Conclude That Section 314802(13)(d) Is Ambiguous At Best.
In the proceedings below, after the District Court erroneously determined TracFone's

wireless service to be an "other communications service" under Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)(d)
based upon its prepaid structure, TracFone offered an additional argument on reconsideration in
the event that the District Court did not agree that the statute unambiguously does not apply to
TracFone. (R. at 001673.) Citing to well-settled Idaho law governing statutory interpretation,
TracFone noted that "where the [statutory] language is capable of more than one reasonable
construction," the "statute is ambiguous." (R. at 001676 (citing Ada County Prosecuting Atty. v.

2007 Legendary Motorcycle, 154 Idaho 351,298 P.3d 245 (2013).)
TracFone stood by (and continues to stand by) its argument that the plain language of the
statute unambiguously does not apply to it, whether by intentional or unintentional omission by
the Idaho Legislature, but offered an alternative argument out of deference to the District Court's
analysis: If the statute can be plainly and unambiguously read in the manner that the District
Court had read it, which TracFone contends it cannot, then at best the result is that the statute
must be deemed ambiguous. As there is no basis to conclude that TracFone's reading of the
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plain and literal language of the statute is unreasonable, if the District Court was to stand

its

reading of the statute as a reasonable reading, then there would necessarily be (at least) two
reasonable readings of the statute. More than one reasonable reading of a statute is the definition
of ambiguity. See, e.g., Verska, 151 Idaho at 896. That the District Court judicially created
ambiguity in the statute by ignoring the plain language thereof, in its effort to fulfill what it
speculated to be the intent or purpose of the statute, does not alter the fact that TracFone's plain
and literal reading of the statute is a rational and coherent reading, and a reasonable
interpretation, of the relevant statutory language.
As TracFone presented a volume of documents demonstrating that the members of the
IECC had historically interpreted the Act as not applicable to sellers of prepaid services like
TracFone, contrary to the District Court's conclusion on summary judgment, the language of
subsection (d) was proven to be at best ambiguous and must therefore be construed strictly
against these taxing authorities. (R. at 001673); In re: Potlatch Forests, Inc., 72 Idaho 291.
a. The District Court erred when it struck relevant evidence demonstrating the
long-held belief of the IECC that the Act did not apply to TracFone.

Before discussing the asserted errors in the District Court's Order denying
reconsideration and affirming summary judgment in favor of the state-affiliated parties on the
applicability of Idaho Code§ 31-4802(13)(d), TracFone turns to the District Court's decision to
strike its submission of several years' worth of IECC meeting Minutes that demonstrate the
IECC's knowledge and repeated recognition that the Idaho statute did not clearly or sufficiently
encompass prepaid wireless services:

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - Page 40

19360-001

The
ruled from the bench, regarding the state's motion to strike
exhibit "A" to the Lloyd affidavit (consisting of IECC official meeting
minutes from the period spanning August 2004 through July 20 2) that the
minutes were irrelevant to the proper interpretation of the Act except
insofar as they might contain some official statement by the IECC
collectively endorsing a particular position regarding
Act's
applicability to prepaid wireless providers .... [s]ince the statements of
commission members ... are not adopted by the commission as a whole
as representative of that body ....
(R. at 001842.) 19

The District Court's error derives from its fundamental misunderstanding of the
underlying purpose for which TracFone submitted the Minutes for consideration. TracFone's
position was not, and is not, that the state-affiliated parties were subject to any form of estoppel
based upon the commentary and recorded votes within the official Minutes (including the votes
to authorize work by certain IECC members to draft legislation that actually would cover prepaid
services). (See generally R. at 001673, 1766, 1789; Tr. 11/25/2013, p. 133:12-23.) Contrary to
the District Court's conclusion, whether or not the IECC ever officially adopted as an entity the
opinions expressed by its members is not relevant - that simply has no bearing on the argument
advanced by TracFone. Rather, the sole question for which TracFone submitted the Minutes was
to demonstrate that reasonable minds (including those collective minds that make up the IECC)
could disagree with the District Court's conclusion that the Act plainly and unambiguously

Again, the IECC did not seek to strike its own Minutes from the record; only the various
Counties did. (R. at 001720, 1756.) Further, only Ada County objected on grounds ofrelevance,
and only then using the argument that the IECC cannot be estopped by comments of its members
(which TracFone did not assert). (R. at 001723-24.) As the District Court only addressed the
relevance objection (R. at 001842), TracFone's appeal here is limited to that issue.
19
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applied to

at 001761;

11/25/2013, p. 133:7-11.)

evidence

demonstrates that, far beyond TracFone's own disagreement, the District Court's reading was not
the clear and unambiguous reading of the statute for the majority of the time frame relevant here.
"A statute will only be regarded as ambiguous when reasonable minds might differ as to
its interpretation." Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841, 847, 216 P.3d 130, 136 (2009). As an
alternative to its argument that the statute unambiguously does not cover TracFone, TracFone
submitted the Minutes to demonstrate that the District Court's decision to apply the statute to
TracFone could not be regarded as the only reasonable way to read the statute (if it could be a
proper reading, at all). By reading the statute in the way that it did, the District Court judicially
created an ambiguity in the statute, highlighted by the recorded history of the (presumably
reasonable) members of the IECC, who repeatedly concluded that the statute was not written to
cover prepaid sales of wireless services. On this point, it is indisputable that the Minutes are
relevant and provide that evidence, as the long history of the IECC members' recorded
comments demonstrates that a distinguished selection of reasonable minds clearly disagreed with
the District Court's conclusion that the Act unambiguously applied to TracFone. The following
represents only an example of how the IECC's historical analysis of the Act is at direct odds with
the District Court's interpretation20 :
•

In December, 2005, "Commissioner Baker wanted to get the other members' thoughts on the
issue that prepaid wireless phones do not have to pay emergency communications fees and
whether a change to the Idaho Emergency Communications Act is needed through legislative

20

A complete analysis of the Minutes is available in the record. (R. at 001692-1705.)
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action." (R. at 001233.) The Commission voted "to send a letter to the counties to get their
support on the concept of changing legislation to include that prepaid wireless phones pay
emergency communications fees." (Id.)
•

In March, 2006, the IECC created a legislative subcommittee; Commissioner Baker
"recommended that when the Commission works on Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
legislation the prepaid wireless language be added." (R. at 001250-1251.)

•

In May, 2007, the month after the 2007 amendments were signed into law, 21 "Commissioner
Baker reported she met with Commissioner Berry and Mr. Goldsmith to approach the topic
of prepaid wireless .... more research is needed to prepare for the next legislative session."
(R. at 001335 (emphasis added).)

•

In September, 2009, Mr. Goldsmith again reiterated unequivocally to the IECC that "we do
not have legislation for pre paid [sic] services." (R. at 001493 (emphasis added).)

•

Then, in November, 2010, "Commissioner Baker reported that the Legislative Subcommittee
has met and come to the realization that the [prepaid] piece of legislation is going to take
some more time ... a few years to be accomplished." (R. at 001565.)
In June, 2012, contradicting its own members' previously-stated views as to the law's

inapplicability to prepaid providers, the IECC filed its counterclaim in this action, citing an older
version of the definition of "telecommunications provider" than the then-applicable definition as

21

Notably, the 2007 amendments were the amendments that the District Court determined
unambiguously applied to TracFone. (See R. at 001031-1033.)
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amended in 2007, and seeking nine (9) years' worth of alleged back-taxes. (R. at 000020-25
(incorrectly citing LC. § 31-4802(10) as the definition of "telecommunications provider").)
The entire history of the IECC's recorded position on the applicability of Act to prepaid
wireless sales, until roughly the moment that this litigation began, reveals a reading of the Act
that follmvs the plain language and does not apply to prepaid wireless sales. The District Court
erred by refusing to consider this recorded history in ascertaining whether TracFone's reading of
the Act was reasonable, such that the District Court's reading would be, at best, a second rational
interpretation and, thus, a judicially-created ambiguity.

For the limited purpose for which

TracFone presented the Minutes to the District Court, they are very relevant and should not have
been stricken.

TracFone respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's

decision to strike the IECC Minutes on the question of reasonableness of TracFone's
interpretation ofldaho Code § 31-4802(13).
b. Under the District Court's analysis, the definition of "telecommunications
provider" becomes too flawed to unambiguously apply to TracFone.
If this Court was to adopt the District Court's interpretation of subsection (d), which

effectively nullifies any meaning and placement of the word "other," and which contradicts its
own observation that the statutory subsections are differentiated by the type of service provided,
the result is that the statute is too imprecisely drafted to be coherent. When statutory language is
drafted in such a way that "the meaning is so doubtful or obscure that 'reasonable minds might
be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning,"' the "statute is ambiguous." State v. Browning, 123
Idaho 748, 750, 852 P.2d 848, 852 (1992). The unavoidable fact is that subsection (d) of the
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definition

"telecommunications provider"

the Act is not a model of grammatical certainty,

such that its meaning becomes both doubtful and obscure \l\'hen the "type of medium through
which the raw information is transmitted" (R. at 001848) no longer defines the boundaries
between the subsections.
This Court very recently reiterated the directive in statutory construction that, "[t]o
analyze the meaning of the statute, 'we must look to the grammatical construction of the statute
as the legislature intended the statute to be construed according to generally accepted principles
of English grammar."' 154 Idaho at 354 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Collinsworth, 96
Idaho 910, 914, 539 P.2d 263, 267 (1975)). By this standard, in amending the definition of
"telecommunications provider" in 2007, the Idaho Legislature may have performed only well
enough to pass the legislation without any concerns being raised, but the legislation itself was
simply not clear. As a result, its meaning is both doubtful and obscure, and reasonable minds
including the historical and collective membership of the IECC

have historically been

uncertain of and have disagreed with this Court's conclusion as to the meaning of Idaho Code §
31-4802(13 )( d).

A careful examination of the definition of "telecommunications provider,"

including its historical origins, is therefore in order.
1.

Legislative History of the Act.

The definition of "telecommunications provider" was not included in the original
iteration of the Act, passed by the legislature in 1988, presumably because telephone service in
1988 was primarily wireline service. (See 1988 Session Laws Ch. 348, Sec. 1.) In that original
law, the terms "telecommunications entities," "telephone companies," and other similar terms
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\;,,·ere

interchangeably,

definition. (Id.) Neither of

two

amendments to

Act (1990 and 1994) included a definition of "telecommunications provider" or any similar,
predecessor term. (See 1990 Session Laws Ch. 200, Sec. 2; 1994 Session Laws Ch. 86, Sec. 1.)

In 2003, after much advancement in and increased use of wireless telecommunication
services (including cellular telephone service), the Legislature made a number of revisions to the
Act. (See 2003 Session Laws Ch. 290.) Some of these changes were undoubtedly influenced by
the Attorney General's 1994 Opinion, advising that the earlier iterations of the law were too
narrowly \vritten to require the E91 l fee to be collected from customers of wireless (cellular)
telephone service. (See AGO 1994-G-0921 (R. at 001667).) Thus, for the first time, the 2003
Legislature added a definition of "telecommunications provider," as follows:
(10) "Telecommunications provider" means any person providing
exchange telephone service to a service address within this state or
any wireless carrier providing telecommunications service to any
customer having a place of primary use within this state.
(2003 Session Laws Ch. 290, Sec. 2.) The obligation for "telecommunications provider[s]," as
defined by the Act, to collect the fee from their customers, was thereby established:
Q} The fee shall be collected from customers on a monthly basis
by all telecommunications entities vmich provide local telephone
line service providers that make available access lines to persons
within the county, or 911 service area, and may be listed as a
separate item on customers' monthly bills.
(2003 Session Laws Ch. 290, Sec. 4.) Thus, the duty to collect and remit 911 fees, from 2003
through 2007, fell onlv on (1) providers of "exchange telephone service" (which TracFone is not,
as acknowledged by both the state-affiliated parties and the District Court), and (2) "wireless
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District Court conectly found does not include

according to the

the Act). (Id.)

specific

In 2007, the Act was again amended, which amendments have now become the focus of
this litigation. Before examining those amendments, TracFone prefaces that when the mode of
information transmission is disregarded as the defining factor between service types, the plain
language of subsection (d) becomes ambiguous by judicial creation, and only thereafter becomes
subject to differing interpretations. This problem is aggravated by the fact that the amended
definition was imprecisely drafted by the Legislature and therefore is not able to be read on its
plain and literal meaning if the differences bet\veen types of service are disregarded. I.C. § 73113(1). Without a significant amount of guesswork as to what the Legislature may have
intended, subsection (d) caih11ot be clearly and unambiguously read to support the District
Court's conclusion that the 2007 amendments were enacted to obligate resellers of wireless
service ("whether on a prepaid or postpaid basis") to collect and remit the E911 fee.
2.

Judicially-Created Ambiguity

In the 2007 amendments, the Legislature altered the previous 2003 statutory definition of
"telecommunications provider," as follows:
(19})
"Telecommunications provider" means any persons
providing~
hl__Eexchange telephone service to a service address within this
state~ or
.(hl_Aany wireless carrier providing telecommunications service to
any customer having a place of primary use within this state: or
(c) Interconnected VoIP service to any customer having a place of
primary use within this state: or

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - Page 47

19360-001

(d) A provider of anv other communications service that connects
an individual having either a service address or a place of primarv
use within this state to an established public safetv answering point
bv dialing 911.
(2007 Session Laws Ch. 340, Sec. 2.). In so doing, it appears as though the legislature failed to
give heed to those general principles of English grammar, and as a result created a statute with
problematic results in its literal reading. To evaluate these problems closely requires isolation of
the various subsections and examining the resulting sentences for their literal meanings.
Subsection (b ):

Likely due to the fact that the Legislature attempted to amend the existing definition of
"telecommunications provider" by merely interjecting new words, rather than simply drafting a
new definition, the clarity in the literal words of the definition is lost in the text of subsection (b ):
"Telecommunications provider" means anv person providing[:) any
wireless carrier providing telecommunications service to any
customer having a place of primary use within this state.

(Emphasis added.) The sentence is clearly problematic. The operative verb ("providing") now
appears twice in the definition, where only a description of what a covered "telecommunications
provider" provides should follow the colon.

Thus, the statute literally reads that a

'"telecommunications provider' means any person providing [a] wireless carrier," rather than (as
it should have) describing that which is provided. Read alone, this section is nonsensical.
However, as the District Court correctly determined, the statute read as a whole reveals
that the Legislature made its intent clear by adding a definition of "wireless carrier" in Idaho
Code § 31-4802(15). Read together, it is clear (though not perfect) that the legislative intent was
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to place the fee collection obligation on

licensees for the types

service that those particular

licensees offer: "cellular" service, "personal communications service," and "certain specialized
mobile radio" service. I.C. § 31-4802(15). As a result, the problems potentially created by the
Legislature's imprecise drafting of subsection (b) are remedied by the integrated application of
the definition of "wireless carrier." Collectively, then, the Legislature's intent by way of
subsection (b) was to address all forms of "wireless" service provided by wireless carriers, and
the other subsections of the definition were intended to address other types of service.
Subsection (d):
"Telecommunications provider" means any person providing[:] a
provider of any other communications service that connects an
individual having either a service address or a place of primary use
within this state to an established public safety answering point by
dialing 911.

Again, because the Legislature placed the operative verb ("providing") before the colon, only a
description of what a covered "telecommunications provider" provides should follow in
subsection (d).

Instead, the literal words of the sentence describe a "telecommunications

provider" as a person "providing a provider." The resulting sentence is incomprehensible and
does not provide a clear and unambiguous description of what a "telecommunications provider"
was intended to address by subsection (d).
Unlike with subsection (b ), however, the problems created by the imprecise drafting of
subsection (d) cannot be remedied by looking anywhere else in the statute. The 2007 legislation
is inconsistent, and with respect to subsection (d), the Legislature failed to articulate its
intentions in clear and unambiguous terms, in a way that would be ascertainable without
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exammmg

context of those \Vords,

policy behind the statute and its legislative

history." Beard, 135 Idaho at 646.
TracFone contends, first and foremost, that the Act, though problematic in its wording,
clearly assigns the collection and remittance obligation for wireless services to those that the
legislature deemed fit to include \vithin the definition of "wireless carrier," which the District
Court agreed did not include a non-licensed reseller of prepaid wireless services like TracFone.
However, if the definition of "telecommunications provider" is not based on the different types
of service provided (exchange, wireless, VoIP, and anything other than those services), as the
District Comi on at least two occasions concluded it does, then TracFone respectfully submits
that there is nothing clear or unambiguous about how TracFone fits within the Act's ambit.
Accordingly, TracFone respectfully submits that the District Court erred when it determined that
a statute with such obvious problems "clearly and unambiguously" applied to TracFone.

III.

The 2013 Amendments To The Act Preclude A Finding That Previous Iterations
Applied To TracFone's Sale Of Prepaid Wireless Service.
In 2013, the Idaho Legislature again amended the Emergency Communications Act,

effective January 1, 2014, this time for the explicit purpose of expanding the 911 tax collection
obligation to encompass prepaid wireless.

The 2013 amendments extended the 911 tax to

prepaid wireless telecommunications service and prescribed a specific collection methodology
for wireless service purchased on a prepaid basis. (See 2013 H.B. 79 (R. at 001648-1655).) That
prescribed methodology set forth in the 2013 amendments is collection of the 911 tax on prepaid
services at the point of retail sale. (Id.) The 2013 amendments, unlike the prior statutes, did not
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distinguish between

providers of wireless

held licenses, and those who

provided service on a resale basis. The 2013 amendments are central to determining whether the
District Court's conclusion may be upheld, in viev,· of the

governing statutory interpretation

of a later-amended statute.
In the 2013 legislative session, the Idaho legislature passed House Bill 79, amending the
Idaho Emergency Communications Act to provide for the first time for both a statutory basis and
a collection methodology for a newly-established "prepaid wireless E9 l 1 fee." (See current § 314813.) The Legislature's decision to adopt a new fee specifically designed for and applicable to
wireless telecommunications service purchased on a prepaid basis filled a void in the previous
iteration of the Act

a void repeatedly acknowledged by the IECC in its meetings for years both

before and after the passage of the 2007 amendments to the Act. 22 Contrary to its position
throughout this litigation and its ongoing representations to the District Court, the IECC knew all
along that the legislature needed to adopt "prepaid legislation . . . mainly going towards
collection at the retail level," in order to have any actual legal basis upon which to assess the tax.
(R. at 001514.) In 2013, the legislature for the first time did so.

22

The IECC Minutes reflect an understanding that the pre-2007 Act, built on the premise that the
E911 tax would be collected via customers' monthly bills, did not contain an adequate
mechanism by which a provider of prepaid, non-billed service could collect the tax. The 2007
addition of subsection (d) did nothing to remedy what the IECC members regarded to be the
primary problem for prepaid providers - the statutory collection mechanism. Thus, it is
disingenuous to contend, as the state-affiliated parties now do, that subsection (d) was intended
to remedy the shortcomings of the Act with regard to prepaid wireless services.
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Years after the IECC's 0\Yn administrator,

advised the Commission

the IECC "may want to start looking at legislation for collecting on prepaid wireless
service," for the express purpose of "picking up the citizens that aren't contributing now" (R. at
001530 (emphasis added).), the IECC and the Idaho Legislature finally passed the legislation in
2013 to, for the first time, establish both a statutory basis and a mechanism by which providers
of wireless telecommunications service purchased on a prepaid basis are now covered by the
Idaho Emergency Commission Act. (R. at pp. 0010648-001655.) Or, as the IECC phrased it at
one point in the lengthy history of this issue, the 2013 amendments finally implemented the longdiscussed "ideas for fixing legislation, because this is probably going to have to be addressed
legislatively." (R. at 001545 (emphasis added).)
The 2013 Legislature opted not to make another effort to further amend the already
problematic definitions contained within Idaho Code § 31-4802. Instead, the Legislature deleted
the former Idaho Code § 31-4813, related to prepaid calling cards, and replaced it with a
comprehensive implementation of the new "Prepaid wireless E911 fee." (See 2013 H.B. 79, Sec.
2 (R. at 001652-1654 ). ) The 2013 amendments contain separate definitions, a separate and
distinct fee that specifically applies to wireless telecommunications service purchased on a
prepaid basis (based on a percentage of the sales transaction, rather than the flat fee otherwise
applicable in the Act), and an exclusivity clause ensuring that the "prepaid wireless E911 fee" is
the only fee that may be collected on "prepaid wireless telecommunications service." (Id.) House
Bill 79, and the soon-to-be-effective Idaho Code § 31-4813, are clear and unambiguous
legislative pronouncements that a specific E911 fee of two and a half percent (2.5%) of the sales
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price is now to be taxed on sales of prepaid

minutes, providing a clear and specific

collection mechanism at the point of retail sale, to ensure that consumers of wireless
telecommunications service purchased on a prepaid basis pay the 911 tax. 23
Though TracFone has already addressed the majority of the canons of statutory
interpretation available to Idaho courts, one of the remaining canons yet to be analyzed in the
context of this statute is that which deals with the Legislature's decision to amend an existing
statute. This Court has stated, "Statutes are construed under the assumption that the legislature
was aware of all other statutes and legal precedence at the time the statute was passed." Druffel

v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 136 Idaho 853, 856, 41 P.3d 739, 742 (2002). "It is a well-established
rule of this Court that where an amendment is made it carries with it the presumption that the
legislature intended the statute thus amended to have a meaning different than theretofore
accorded it." Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc. v. State, 132 Idaho 673, 676, 978 P.2d 233, 236
( 1999) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). "That rule of construction indicates not
only the intention of the new law but also that of the old." Leonard Const. Co. v. State ex rel.

State Tax Commission, 96 Idaho at 896 (emphasis added).
The 2013 amendments did not merely provide a new collection methodology for
providers of wireless services purchased on a prepaid basis to begin assessing an E911 fee. (See

23

Under the 2013 law, the 911 tax on prepaid wireless service is collected at the point of retail
sale. Where the sale takes place at a retail vendor location (e.g. Wal-Mart), the vendor collects
and remits. Where the sale is made directly through the service provider (e.g. by purchasing
service through the provider's website), the provider collects and remits the tax at the same rate
as vendors. Additionally, unlike the flat monthly tax on billed services, the prepaid tax under the
2013 law is 2.5% of the sales transaction. LC.§ 31-4813(2)(a) (2013).
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2013 H.B. 79, Sec. 2 (R. at

652-1654).) Rather, the amendments specified and imposed a

new and specific tax to be assessed on such sales. (Id.)

fact that the Legislature only recently

passed legislation to impose a tax on sales of prepaid \x,'ireless service undermines the District
Court's conclusion that such a tax already existed in Idaho.

Had the Legislature, with its

presumed knowledge "of all other statutes and legal precedence," Drujfel, supra, intended that
the 2007 iteration of the Act already applied to services purchased on a prepaid basis, there
would have been no need for the Legislature to have created a new fee and collection
methodology specifically designed for prepaid services.
What the District Court erroneously concluded by determining that the pre-2013 version
of the Act already applied to TracFone was that the existence of the fee collection obligation was
the exact same in the 2007 iteration of the Act as now exists in the 2013 iteration. Following the
above-cited rules of statutory construction, the District Court erred as a matter of law in
construing the pre-2013 Act in this manner.

If the 2007 changes to the Act created a fee

collection/remittance requirement on services purchased on a prepaid basis, then the 2013
legislation is completely moot and devoid of purpose. As a matter of law, the 2007 amendments
simply cannot be permissibly read in this manner.
ATTOR.i"\1EY FEES

'" Attorney fees are awardable only where they are authorized by statute or contract,' ...
or by court rule, Gibson v. Ada County Sheriffs Office, 147 Idaho 491, 496-97, 211 P.3d 100,
105-06 (2009) .... " Capps v. FIA Card Servs., NA., 149 Idaho 737, 744, 240 P.3d 583, 590
(2010).

In this case, the state-affiliated parties have sought a declaratory judgment and
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dependent damages associated

an alleged statutory

TracFone to collect and

remit E911 taxes. Applicable here, Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) reads:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as
adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the
state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding,
including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's
fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
As evidenced by the extensive history of the IECC meeting Minutes, the state-affiliated parties
have pursued nine (9) years' worth of alleged back-taxes, the vast majority of those taxes
allegedly having come due during the timeframe that the IECC was actively investigating ways
to "fix" the applicable statute.
The IECC (and, by extension, the remaining state-affiliated parties) clearly knew that
there was no existing basis at law to impose the E911 tax collection and remittance obligation on
an entity that fell outside of the statutory definition of "telecommunications provider," but have
forced TracFone to litigate this issue nonetheless. TracFone respectfully requests that this Court
order that TracFone is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117, and return this case
to the District Court with instructions to resolve the remainder of the underlying litigation
consistent with a finding that TracFone was not obligated as a "telecommunications provider" to
collect and remit E911 taxes.

CONCLUSION
On the grounds and under the authority set forth herein, TracFone respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the District Court's determinations that TracFone was a provider of "other
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communications service" under

and that

Code § 31

tax collection and

remittance obligations of Idaho Code § 31-4804 clearly and unambiguously

to TracFone

prior to July 1, 2013, and remand this case back to the District Court with instructions to
conclude this matter consistently with that determination.
Dated this

L~~ay of August, 2014.
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A.
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